Social choice decision aggregation is a form of complex system modelling which is based upon voters' rankings over a set of candidates. Different social choice functions, such as Borda count, plurality count or Condorcet methods models different aspects of social choice decision criteria. One of such criteria which has not been fully described or modelled, is the notion of compromise. This article aims to define a measure which would capture the notion of compromise on a given profile of voter preferences, about certain candidate being appointed to a certain position by a certain social welfare function. The goal is to define what compromise should mean, and proposes the so-called "d-measure of divergence" as a measure of divergence for some candidate to be positioned to a certain position. This study compares the results of two well-established social welfare functions, Borda and plurality count d-measure of divergence.
INTRODUCTION
Basis of this article is the mathematical description of the notion of compromise. The need to formally determine how we should interpret the notion of compromise comes from the following example. Let there is an election in which one hundred voters should choose between three candidates: A, B and C. Each voter places its vote by ordering those candidates. That ordering we will call a preference, and denote it α i . Set of all preferences for those hundred voters, a profile is given in Table 1 , in which fifty one voters have preference A ├ B ├ C, while forty nine voters have preference C ├ B ├ A. Given the profile α, which candidate should win? Most of the classical social choice functions would say -candidate A. Borda count would produce A ├ B ├ C linear ordering, result of plurality count would be A ├ C ├ B (with A winning the most first places, and B the least). Condorcet method would duel all candidates, and those duels would yield A ├ B ├ C ordering. All those classical methods have one thing in common: winner should be candidate A. Nevertheless, that is a candidate that 49% of voters see as the worst choice. Should A then be a winner? What should be result if we approach to a profile α looking for compromise? If we want from social choice function to address notion of compromise, would it be better if candidate B is declared as a winner? This leads us to the main topic of this article: finding a way for determining a value which should capture notion of compromise on a given profile, for placing a candidate on a certain position in linear ordering.
Let us concentrate on the example in Table 1 . If we take a look at candidate A, in a given profile he/she is placed first in 51 preferences, and placed third in 49 preferences. Therefore, in 51 preferences, distance between his position and the first place is 0 (places), and in 49 preferences that distance equals 2 (places). If we simply sum all those distances (for each candidate) over profile, we would get a measure of distance between profile placements of a candidate and a first place. But, for such a measure, one can easily prove that ranking based on it gives result equivalent to Borda count.
In the core of the notion of compromise, however, lays a need to punish of discourage bigger distances; this means that when we are looking for a way to describe compromise about a candidate being placed at the winning position, each position should contribute to a sum (of distances) with more than its linear contribution. Therefore, we will take a look at a sum of weighted distances, that is, distances to the power of d, d being a real number greater than 1.
If we sum such weighted distances from the first place over profile α for a candidates A, B and C, we get the following expression:
of linear ordering. Unlike distance function from works of Seiford and Cook [1] , we do not form measure of distance between preferences. Rather than that, we establish measure divergence from compromise (or consensus) that certain candidate should be positioned on certain position. But the goal is similar: it is in interest of society to minimize that measure. This leads us to the basic definitions, as done in [2] .
BASIC DEFINITIONS Definition 1.1
(d-Measure of divergence from the first position.) Let M = {M 1 ; …; M m } be set of m candidates, and let α  L(M) n be a profile of n voters over those candidates. We define a dmeasure of divergence from the first position for a candidate
where α i k stands for a position of the candidate M k in a preference of i-th voter α i , and for some real value d > 1.
Now we can easily extend definition to a d-measure of divergence from a j-th position of the k-th candidate. n be a profile of n voters over those candidates. We define a d-measure of divergence from a j-th position for a candidate
Given this definition, it is only natural to gather β j d (M k ), values in a form of a matrix.
Definition 1.3
(d-Measure of divergence matrix.) Let M = {M 1 ; …; M m } be set of m candidates, and let α  L(M) n be a profile of n voters over those candidates. We define a d-measure of divergence matrix:
for some real value d > 1.
As we can see, in j-th column of a matrix M d we have d-measures of divergence from j-th position for all candidates, while in i-th row of matrix M d , we have d-measures of divergence from all positions for a candidate M i .
COMPROMISE AS A SORITES PARADOX
Before proceeding, let us say something about the value of parameter d. In the example given in the Table 1 we see that, if we want candidate B to have smaller d-measure of divergence from a first position than candidate A (which means, if we want candidate B to be declared a compromise winner on a given profile), it should be 1 ( ) < 1 ( )  > log 2 100 − log 2 49.
(2)
But, what is the value of d that should be used generally? Answering to that question requires finding an answer to the following version of a Sorites paradox [3] : Let us say that n voters are voting through strict linear ordering over the set of three candidates, {A, B, C}. For some k  N, ⌈ /2⌉ ≤ ≤ , they form a profile α basic given in Table 2 . Phenomenon that lies at a heart of the paradox is recognized as the phenomenon of vagueness; the concept of heap appears to lack sharp boundaries, just as the concept of compromise winner does in our case. Nevertheless, we will approach to the issue not as to a paradox, but (same as Eubulides did) as a puzzle.
From statement that for a value of = ⌈ /2⌉ we have one candidate as a compromise winner on a given profile, while for a value of k = n we have another candidate as a compromise winner, using the Least-number principle, we shall conclude that there is some k 0 between those two values, such that for k 0 compromise winner on a profile basic is a candidate B, and for k 0 + 1 compromise winner is candidate A. Value k 0 should be result of an a priori social choice of a group which is about to use this model. In this section we will provide an answer to that question. To do that, we will first consider three candidate scenario, followed by scenarios with more candidates. Let us consider a Theorem 2.1. (Table 3) we will call Condorcet triples. Those profiles consist of three preferences on which neutral and anonymous social choice function should form a tie (or a cycle) as a result. As Saari showed [5] , all scoring point functions are invariant in regard of Condorcet triplet removal, which includes both Borda and plurality count. Furthermore, it is easy to prove that a d-measure of divergence from the j-th position preserves ordering among candidates when profile is reduced for the Condorcet triple: 2.2. Lemma. Let A and B be any two candidates from the set of candidates M. For a d-measure of divergence from the j-th position , and profiles α and α', α' being the profile derived from α by removal of one Condorcet triple, we have
With removal of one Condorcet triple from the profile , every of three candidates loses exactly one first placement, one second placement and one third placement. Therefore all candidates lose same amount of points in Borda count, as well as same amount of first places count in plurality count. That means that their placements remain the same in both Borda and plurality count. Same applies to the d-measure of divergence from the j-th place: all three candidates lose same values in calculation of , which means that their relative position in regard to d-measure of divergence from the first position remains the same. Table 3 . Condorcet triples: profiles of 1 (left) and 2 (right).
Since both Borda and plurality count, as well as d-measure of divergence from the j-th position relations among candidates, are Condorcet triple invariant, we can reduce a set of all possible combinations of voters preferences to a set of preferences without Condorcet triples. This means that largest profile we should analyse consists of (some number of) two preferences from  1 and two from  2 . Beside profiles that reduce to one-preference profiles, Table 4 shows all possible two-preference profiles without Condorcet triples.
Profiles in Table 4 are same up to the permutation of candidates; each of profiles in one group of profiles can be obtained from the other by some permutations of the candidates. There are 15 different profiles, which equals to ( ), the number of possible ways to choose two from six preferences. Same way, three and four preference reduced profiles are grouped up to the permutation of candidates in Tables 5 and 6 .
In Table 5 we have all together 18 profiles which equals to ( ) -2, that is all three preference combinations except for Condorcet triples. In Table 6 there are 9 four-preference profiles which equals to ( )( ) , number of way we can select two preferences out of each Condorcet triple.
Proof of the Theorem 2.1 now follows from Lemmas 1-11 given in the Appendix. Table 4 . Two-preference reduced profiles.
In case with more than three candidates, similar claim cannot be proven. If there are four candidates, there are profiles on which plurality count produces different winner than Borda count, and with smaller d-measure of divergence form the first position. Consider the following theorem. 
Theorem. Let
We will show that there are natural numbers m, i and j such that Theorem 2.3. holds for given d > 1. First, we will set
This makes candidate A plurality winner on a profile. Now, let candidate B be Borda winner on the same profile. In that case we have 1.
2.
3. Table 5 . Three-preference reduced profiles. Table 6 . Four-preference reduced profiles.
From condition (4) follows
Therefore, if conditions (4) and (5) are satisfied, then conditions (6) and (7) are met. Let us set a value for m which satisfies condition (5):
Let us just point out, that from condition (8) follows fulfilment of condition (9). We want to construct profile , such that for a given d > 1 we have
with m, i and j satisfying (4) and (5). Now we have
It is easy to show that Shortly, we are looking for i, j and m such that m = 2i -j -1 and
On the left side of inequality (10) we have linear expression (with regard to i), which can be interpreted as a line. Lemma 12 proofs that coefficient of that straight line is less than 1 for all d > 1 (with coefficient of the straight line on the right side of the inequality (10) being equal to 1). Therefore, there must exist solutions i and j, for i being large enough. To make sure that in the solution span for j there is at least one integer value, we will set a condition that right side of inequality must be greater than the left side for at least 1:
Finally, we pick i such that it satisfies (11), j such it satisfies (10), while for m we have m = 2i -j -1, which proves the Theorem 2.3.
Let us demonstrate construction of the profile on which Borda winner has a greater d-measure of divergence from the first position than a plurality winner with an example. 
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 1.
Proof of the Lemma is trivial, since Borda and plurality winner on the profile  1 are the same. It follows that both methods have same winner on all profiles obtained by addition of some number of Condorcet triples.
LEMMA 2.
Let  1 be a profile over the set of candidates M = {A, B, C}, without any Condorcet triples. Furthermore, let  1 be a profile of a form
with  being some permutation over the set M. Then, for every profile  obtained as a union of  1 and some number of copies of Condorcet triples 1 
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 2.
Same as for Lemma 1., proof is trivial, since both the Borda and the plurality count produce same winner on a given profile for all n, m  N.
LEMMA 3.
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 3.
Because of symmetry of the positions of the candidates (A) and (C) in a profile  1 , without loss of generality we can assume that m > n. It follows that candidate (A) is Borda winner, since because of 2m > m + n he/she has better Borda score than candidate (B), and because of 2m > 2n he/she has better Borda score than candidate (C). Plurality count under the same assumption produces (A) as a plurality winner, which proves the Lemma 3.
LEMMA 4.
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 4.
Because of symmetry of the positions of the candidates (A) and (B) in a profile  1 , without loss of generality we can assume that m > n. For Borda count we have (A) ├ (B)  2m+n > 2n + m, because of m > n. Since (C) cannot be Borda winner, it follows that candidate (A) is both the Borda and the plurality winner on the profile  1 , which proves the Lemma 4.
LEMMA 5.
Let First, let us assume that m  n. Then plurality winner is candidate B. Candidate C cannot be Borda winner, since B is better ranked candidate in on preferences. For candidate A to be a Borda winner, we should have 2m > m+2n  m > 2n, which contradicts m  n. Therefore, plurality winner is in that case also a Borda winner, which proves the Lemma 5.
In case of m > n, plurality winner is candidate A. If in that case holds m + 2n > 2m  n > m/2, we have a candidate B winning by Borda score (otherwise, candidate A is also a Borda winner, which proves the 
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 6.
Without loss of generality, we will prove Lemma 6. for the profile k l m A C C B A B C B A . On that profile, plurality winner can be candidate A or candidate C. First, let us assume that plurality winner is candidate A. It follows k > l + m. From there we have:
k > l + m  2k > 2l + 2m  2k + l > 3l + 2m. Since Borda score of candidate A equals to 2k + l, and Borda score of candidate C equals to 2l + 2m, it follows 2k + l > 3l +2m > 2l +2m, which means that candidate A has a higher Borda score than candidate B. In the same time, we have 2k + l > k + m , k + l > m, because of k > l + m, so candidate A has higher Borda score than candidate B, which makes candidate A both plurality and Borda winner, and proves the Lemma 6.
If, however, we assume that candidate C is plurality winner on a given profile, then we have k < m + l.
(12) In this case, if candidate A is Borda winner, it should have higher Borda score than candidate B, which yields 2k
and higher Borda score than candidate C
(14) If this condition is met, candidate C is plurality, and candidate A Borda winner. Let us examine whether in that case the candidate C can have lower d-measure of divergence from the first place than candidate A. In other words, whether there is d > 1 such that 1 ( ) < 1 ( ),? In that case we have (with k > m)
• 2 < + • 2  2 < − . But, from condition (14) one has:
> + 2  − < 2, so we conclude that there is no such d > 1, which proves the Lemma 6.
LEMMA 7.
with  being some permutation over the set M. Then, for every profile  obtained as a union of  1 and some number of copies of Condorcet triples 1 and 2 it follows
for some W BC , W PC  M, winners by Borda and plurality count respectively over the profile , where W BC ,  W PC , if such W PC exists.
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 7.
Without loss of generality, we can drop permutation function . On a given profile, plurality winner can be candidate A or C. If A is plurality winner, it follows k + m > l. For A to be Borda winner it should have greater Borda score than C, so 2k + l + 2m > 2l + m, i.e. 2k + m > l which holds because of plurality winning condition. Therefore, if A is plurality winner, then it is also Borda winner, which proves the Lemma 7.
On the other hand, if C is plurality winner, then we have:
For A to be Borda winner (compared to C), we have 2k
Conditions (15) and (16) result in m + k < l < m + 2k. For a profile  1 and d > 1 for which d-measure of divergence form the first place for a candidate C is smaller than the one for the candidate A, must hold:
But from the condition (16) it follows that m + k2 d > m + 2k > l, which leads to the conclusion that C cannot have smaller d-measure of divergence from the first place than candidate A, which proves the Lemma 7.
LEMMA 8.
with  being some permutation over the set M. Then, for every profile  obtained as a union of  1 and some number of copies of Condorcet triples 1 and 2 it follows 1 ( ) < 1 ( ),
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 8.
Without loss of generality, we will prove Lemma 8. for the profile
On that profile, every candidate can be a plurality winner. First, let us assume that plurality winner is candidate A. If so, then next conditions hold:
Let us prove that in this case, candidate A is also the Borda winner. He/she will have higher Borda score than candidate B if and only if 2k + l + m > k + 2m  k + l > m, which holds because of condition (18). On the other hand, candidate A will have higher Borda score than candidate C if and only if 2k + l + m > 2l  2k + m > l, which holds because of condition (17). We conclude that in that case candidate A is both Borda and plurality winner, which proves the Lemma 8.
Secondly, let us now assume that candidate B is plurality winner. It follows:
(20) Candidate B has higher Borda score than candidate C, that is, k + 2m > l because of condition (18). But for candidate B does not have to have higher Borda score than candidate A. For A to have higher Borda score than B, it must hold Thirdly, let us now assume that candidate C is plurality winner. It follows:
Candidate C does not have to be Borda winner; both A and B can have higher Borda score. Candidate A has higher Borda score than candidate C if: 2k + m > l.
(24) That is, together with conditions (22) and (23) fulfilled for k = 2, m = 3 and l = 4). Conversely, candidate B has higher Borda score than C if k/2 + m > l (which is, together with conditions (22) and (23) fulfilled for k = 4, m = 5 and l = 6). Yet, candidate A will always have higher Borda score than B. It follows from 2k + l + m > k + 2m  k + l > m, which holds because of condition (23). Therefore, between A and B, only candidate A can be Borda winner. We will prove that in this case, candidate A as a Borda winner, has smaller d-measure of divergence from the first place than candidate C for all d > 1, that is 1 ( ) < 1 ( )  + < ( + ) • 2 . Now we have:
+ < {(24)} < ( + )2 = ( + ) • 2 , for all d > 1, which proves the Lemma.
LEMMA 9.
with  being some permutation over the set M. Then, for every profile  obtained as a union of  1 and some number of copies of Condorcet triples 1 and 2 it follows 
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 9.
As before, without loss of generality we will prove Lemma 9. for the profile
In this case we have symmetry between positions of candidates A and C. Therefore, it is sufficient to analyse situation in which is candidate A plurality winner. In that case we have:
Plurality winner A has higher Borda score than candidate B, because of k + 2n + l > (k + n) + n + l > {(25)} > (l + m) + n + l = 2l + n + m > m. But candidate A does not have to have higher Borda score than C. Namely, C is Borda winner if 2l + 2m + n > 2k + 2n + l, l + 2m > 2k + n, (26) which can be fulfilled (together with condition (25)) for m > k. For instance k = 1, l = 3, m = 4 and n = 7 meet conditions (25) and (26). In such profiles A is the plurality and C the Borda winner. We will prove that in this case, candidate C has lower d-measure of divergence from the first place than candidate A, for all d > 1. Let R  N be a natural number such that
Such a number exists because of condition (25). From (26) it follows l + 2m > 2k + n  l + 2m > 2k + l + m -k + R, m> k + R. If we compare d-measures of divergence from the first place for A and C, we have:
From condition (27) one has m > k, and therefore
Since from condition (27) it follows that R/(m -k) < 1, Lemma 9. is proven for all d > 1.
LEMMA 10.
PROOF OF THE LEMMA 10.
Without loss of generality we will prove Lemma 10. for the profile
Here, all three candidates can be plurality winner. Since there is symmetry between positions of candidates A and B, we will analyse two situations: one in which A is plurality winner, and other in which C is plurality winner. Furthermore, all claims proven for candidate A can be easily transformed into claims for candidate B.
First let us assume that candidate A is plurality winner. In that case we have:
(29) Let us show that C has lower Borda score than A: 2k + l + n > 2l + 2m  2k + n = l + 2m. Now we have 2k + n > {(28)} > 2(l + m) + n = 2l + 2m + n > l + 2m. But candidate B can have higher Borda score than plurality winner A. For that, it must hold
Conditions (28)-(30) can be met in the same profile. For instance l = 2, m = 5, n = 6 and k = 8 satisfy these conditions. In such profiles candidate A is plurality, and candidate B is Borda winner. We will prove that for all d > 1 we have 1 ( ) < 1 ( ). With addition of conditions (29) and (30) we get
If k + m  l + n, then because of (31) follows l2 d < m2 d , which proves the claim. Let us therefore assume that k + m > l + n. Thus, we have
This claim holds for all d > 1 if
which follows from condition (30). This proves that Borda winner B has lower d-measure of divergence from the first place for all d > 1 than plurality winner A (because of symmetry same claim holds for Borda winner A and plurality winner B). Last thing to do, is to analyse profiles  1 for which candidate C is plurality winner. In these cases we have:
(33) But C does not have to be Borda winner. For A to be a Borda winner (similar analysis can be made for B because of symmetry), we should have:
for A to have higher Borda score than B, and 2k + l + n > 2l + 2m  2k + n > l + 2m, (35) for A to have higher Borda score than C. Existence of such profile (with A Borda, and C plurality winner) demonstrates example of profile  1 in which we have k = 2, l = 3, m = 1 and n = 3. These values satisfy conditions (32)-(35). We will prove that for profiles that satisfy these four conditions, for all d > 1 we have:
Let us first show that k + n > m. Because of condition (35) we have 2k + n > l + 2m. If we subtract k from both sides of that inequality (which is something we are allowed to do, because from (32) follows k < l + m), we have k + n > m + (l + m -k). Since l + m -k is a positive number (because of (32)), it follows that k + n > m  (k + n)2 d > m2 d .
Now we have
These inequalities hold for all d > 1 if there is + + − < 2,  l + 2m < 2k + n, which follows from condition (35). We conclude that, in this case also, Borda winner has lower d-measure of divergence from the first place than plurality winner, which proves the Lemma 10.
LEMMA 11.
Let  1 be a profile over the set of candidates M = {A, B, C}, without any Condorcet triples. Without loss of generality we will prove Lemma 11. for the profile k l m n A C A B B A C A C B B C . Here we also have symmetry between positions of two candidates -this time, candidates B and C. Therefore, there are two situations we must analyse: first, in which candidate A is plurality winner, and second in which candidate B is plurality winner. For A to be a plurality winner, we must have:
k + m > l, (36) k + m > n.
(37) Let us prove, that in this case candidate A is also a Borda winner. For A to have higher Borda score than B, it should hold: 2k +2m + l + n < 2n + k  k + 2m + l > n, which follows from condition (37). On the other hand, for A to have higher Borda score than C, it should hold 2k +2m + l + n < 2l + m  2k + m + n > l, which follows from condition (36). Since plurality winner A is also a Borda winner, Lemma 10. is proven for such profiles.
Second, if candidate B is plurality winner, we have; n > k + m, (38) n > l.
(39) In this case, candidate A can be Borda winner. For A to have higher Borda scores than B and C, it should hold: 2k +2m + l + n > 2n + k, k + 2m + l > n, (40) 2k +2m + l + n > 2l + m, 2k + m + n > l.
Condition (41) is always fulfilled because of condition (39). Conditions (38)-(40) can be satisfied if we choose n which satisfy max{l, k + m} < n < (k + m) + m + l. For instance, these conditions are fulfilled for k = 2, l = 1, m = 3 and some n which satisfies 5 < n < 9. On such a profile the Borda winner is candidate A and plurality winner is candidate C. We will prove that for all d > 1 and d-measure of divergence from the first place holds:
From condition (38) follows n > k, so we have:
Lemma is proven for all d > 1 if we have + − + < 2  n < k + l + 2m, which follows from condition (40). This proves that Borda winner, candidate A has lower d-measure of divergence from the first place (for all d > 1) than plurality winner, candidate B.
